The effect of disclosure on investment efficiency – Evidence from the listed companies of Bangladesh
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.65453/ijar.v9i2.1217Keywords:
Disclosure, Investment efficiency, Dhaka stock exchange, BangladeshAbstract
The general perception is that disclosure improves monitoring, which reduces managements’ ability to exploit corporate resources. Hence, the purpose of the study is to investigate whether disclosure increases investment efficiencies. Thirty Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) listed companies, ranging from 2006 to 2020, are selected to test the hypothesis. Then, firm-specific investment is estimated as a function of sales growth. The residual from this estimation is considered as the deviation from the expected investment. Afterwards, a disclosure scoring system is developed based on 28 criteria that encompass both financial and non-financial disclosure. Using the multinomial logit model, the likelihood of under-invest or over-invest is predicted based on the disclosure practices. The overall disclosure level of Bangladeshi listed companies is quite low. The result suggests that disclosure practices have a significant impact on investment efficiency. If the disclosure increases, the likelihood of under-invest or over-invest decreases. The study is conducted on Bangladeshi data, which have not been done before. Moreover, in this study, both financial and non-financial disclosure is considered. Hence, the findings would be beneficial for academics, managers and regulators to have a better understanding of disclosure practices and their influence on investment efficiency.
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