

Factional government and united nations global initiatives' fight against human trafficking in Libya

Edwin Ihechituru Edwin

Department of Public Administration and Local Government,
Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Email: edwiniedwin@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The study focuses on Factional Government and United Nations Global Initiatives (UN.GIFT) fight against human trafficking in Libya. The study observes that Libya's fragmented political scene posed persistent obstacles to United Nations Global Initiatives (UN.GIFT). Trying to respond to the problem, the U.N. has sought to gain the buy-in of important local constituencies - rightly so, given that local conflicts are a crucial element of the struggles at the national level. Yet, in their search for credible local representatives, mediators have faced increasingly fractious communities. The study found out that fragmented government in Libya's created a political scene that posed persistent obstacles to UN.GIFT due to the ongoing conflict between rival groups with its own parliament and government seeking control of the territory of Libya. It recommends among others that U.N. should broker a lasting peace which ought to overshadow competing peace conferences sponsored by various foreign governments. Meanwhile, The porosity of Libya's borders should be controlled particularly in the southern Fezzan in order to reduce trafficking and smuggling of illicit materials, including weapons.

Keywords:

Human trafficking, United Nations Global Initiative, fragmented, Libya.

Article History:

Received: 10 Dec 2023

Accepted: 11 Mar 2024

Available Online: 05 Apr 2024



© 2023 The authors. This is an open access article under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License.

1. INTRODUCTION

The structural obstacle in the fight against human trafficking is the first Libyan civil war in 2011, overthrow and collapse of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and the ousting and death of Muammar Gaddafi which led to the end of his rule over Libya, assumption of Interim control by National Transition Council (NTC), foreign military intervention, diplomatic recognition of NTC as sole governing authority for Libya by 105 countries (Edwin, 2022). The civil war's aftermath and proliferation of armed groups led to a factional violence and instability across the country which erupted a renewed civil war in 2014 and remains Libya's fragmented political scene known as the second Libyan civil war. The second Libyan civil war is an ongoing conflict among rival groups with its own parliament and government seeking control of the territory of Libya. The conflict has been mostly between the government of the Council of Deputies that was elected democratically in 2014 and internationally recognized as the "Libyan Government", also known as the "Tobruk government"; and the rival Islamist government of the General National Congress (GNC), also called the "National Salvation Government", based in the capital Tripoli. In December 2015 these two factions agreed in principle to unite as the Government of National Accord. Although the Government of National Accord is now functioning, its authority is still unclear as specific details acceptable to both sides have not yet been agreed upon (Donnelly, 2007)

The Tobruk government, strongest in eastern Libya, has the loyalty of Haftar's Libyan National Army and has been supported by air strikes by Egypt and the UAE. The Islamist government of the GNC, strongest in western Libya, rejected the results of the 2014 election, and is led by the Muslim Brotherhood, backed by the wider Islamist coalition known as "Libya Dawn" and other militias, and aided by Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey. In addition to these, there are also smaller rival groups: the Islamist Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, led by Ansar al-Sharia (Libya), which has had the support of the GNC; the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL's) Libyan provinces; as well as Tuareg militias of Ghat, controlling desert areas in the southwest; and local forces in Misrata District, controlling the towns of Bani Walid and Tawergha. The belligerents are coalitions of armed groups that sometimes change sides. In recent months there have been many political developments. The United Nations brokered a cease-fire in December 2015, and on 31 March 2016 the leaders of a new UN-supported "unity government" arrived in Tripoli. On 5 April, the Islamist government in western Libya announced that it was suspending operations and handing power to the new unity government, officially named the "Government of National Accord", although it was not

yet clear whether the new arrangement would succeed. On 2 July, rival leaders reached an agreement to reunify the eastern and western managements of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC). As of 22 August, the unity government still had not received the approval of Haftar's supporters in the Tobruk government, and on 11 September the general boosted his political leverage by seizing control of two key oil terminals. (Breznau, 2016). Haftar and the NOC then reached an agreement for increasing oil production and exports, and all nine of Libya's major oil terminals were operating again in January 2017.

Libya's fragmented political scene has posed persistent obstacles to United Nations Global Initiatives (UN.GIFT). Trying to respond to the problem, the U.N. has sought to gain the buy-in of important local constituencies - rightly so, given that local conflicts are a crucial element of the struggles at the national level. Yet in their search for credible local representatives, mediators have faced increasingly fractious communities. Figures deemed local heavyweights suddenly lose grassroots support. Four years of struggles over national power between elites claiming to represent their particular local constituencies have eroded local cohesion. The result is yet deeper fragmentation and higher obstacles to conflict resolution. Localism was a central factor in the 2011 Libyan revolution. In the first weeks of the revolution, individual cities and tribes rapidly took positions for and against the regime of former dictator Moammar Gaddafi. Although these positions often concealed considerable local rifts and fence-sitting, they were quickly locked in as local unity became a matter of survival for revolutionary strongholds, and entire communities became stigmatized as regime loyalists. Military forces organized themselves at the local level and remained attached to particular cities or even neighborhoods, while local councils emerged to manage vital supplies and services and speak for their communities (Bales, 2012). Following regime collapse, a succession of weak interim governments fell prey to the multitude of local interests, and revolutionary armed groups evolved into powerful militias that seized state assets and engaged in increasingly fierce rivalries. In the absence of central government authority, one may have expected local representative and decision-making structures to consolidate, local communities to close ranks against external threats and local armed groups to cement their hold over patches of territory. Instead, the fragmentation of the national political scene is now mirrored at the local level. Local elites are losing their key political resource: their ability to speak for their communities (Azarian, 2011).

In many localities, a growing array of competing "councils" and "committees" are taking positions in national politics in the name of entire

cities or tribes, turning a practice developed during the revolution into a parody of itself. Undiscerning observers may be fooled by the never-ending succession of conferences purportedly assembling the country's tribes for particular political ends. The tribes are best understood as merely another arena for competition between political entrepreneurs at the community level: Even representatives of the same sub-section of a tribe often take diametrically opposed positions. This also applies to many of the countless initiatives by local notables to mediate conflicts – some of which have resulted in tenuous local cease-fires. Too often, however, increasingly fractious local elites have been unable to rein in local armed groups attacking other communities, despite the disastrous consequences of such acts for their own cities (Gallegher, 2009). Misrata emerged from the revolution as a major power center, with cohesive local institutions, including those for the oversight of armed groups. However, as leading Misratan politicians aggressively pursued an agenda of continuing revolution in the post-Gaddafi era, the city's elite diverged (Azarian, 2011). Revenge acts exacted by Misratan armed groups on neighboring communities in the final days of the revolution laid the base for future conflicts. In October 2012, Misratan politicians and armed groups led the charge to capture the neighboring town of Bani Walid, allegedly to seize fugitive former regime officials. In Tripoli, Misratan factions exerted political influence until withdrawing in November 2013, when a Misratan militia fired at protesters in Tripoli, sparking clashes that killed dozens. At home, there were growing disagreements over the role of the city's revolutionary hardliners and armed groups, which had damaged Misratan business interests across the country.

The city closed ranks one more time, if only superficially and temporarily, behind the July 2014 "Libya Dawn" operation against positions in Tripoli held by militias from the city of Zintan, signaling an escalation of the conflicts into civil war. The offensive was launched by a handful of Misratan politicians and militia leaders who joined up with groups from Tripoli and Zawiya, claiming to defend the revolution against a planned coup by former regime elements. The bulk of Misratan forces joined the fray, with some reluctance, two weeks into the operation. But as battlefield progress stalled in early 2015 and U.N.-led mediation efforts gained momentum, the façade of local unity crumbled. Several of the offensive's Misratan masterminds now positioned themselves as architects of a compromise, provoking fierce attacks from their erstwhile allies. Some of the largest armed groups suffered internal splits after they negotiated ceasefires with their former enemies and were reviled as traitors by other local factions. Misrata's hardliners backed the Tripoli-based government – whose current Prime Minister, Khalifa al-Ghwell, is from Misrata – while their local adversaries supported the U.N.-led negotiations. When the talks moved to potential candidates for a unity government, further rifts emerged among local proponents of an agreement. Contrary to local politicians' intentions, the repeated instrumentalization of local unity for particular political ends has left Misrata irreversibly divided (Pourmokhtari, 2015). Bani Walid's path in Libya's power struggles could not have been more different from Misrata's. In 2011, the city served as a recruitment base for volunteers enrolling in Gaddafi's counter-insurgency. Several of its notables featured prominently in the regime's efforts to rally loyal tribal constituencies. An attempted uprising in the city was violently repressed, provoking a rift through Bani Walid's social fabric and hardening the revolutionary fervor of those who lost family members in the crackdown. A small group of revolutionary fighters from Bani Walid reentered the city when it eventually fell, as one of the regime's last bastions. Majority opinion in Bani Walid remained hostile to the revolution, which was widely equated with the defeat of their city and its tribe, the Warfalla (Donnelly, 2007)

Bani Walid's revolutionaries were soon driven out. In their place, a group of local politicians established the so-called Social Council, which adopted a staunchly counter-revolutionary stance and claimed to represent the Warfalla tribe. The council, influenced by former regime officials from the city now exiled in Egypt, began holding conferences with representatives of other tribal constituencies branded as pillars of the former regime and losers of the revolution. In mid-2012, armed groups from Bani Walid seized several Misratans on nearby roads. The death of one of these hostages, shortly after his release following protracted negotiations with the council, triggered the above-mentioned mobilization of a Misratan-led coalition of revolutionary forces that captured Bani Walid yet again, following heavy fighting, in October 2012. The units deployed to control Bani Walid were gradually forced out again, and Social Council members who had fled the city during the offensive returned. Bani Walid's humiliating second capture further galvanized local resentment of the

post-revolutionary order. But it also weakened the council, whose uncompromising stance some held at least partly responsible for the disaster. Changes in council leadership brought a shift to a less belligerent posture, and distance from former regime elements based abroad. No new counter-revolutionary conferences followed, despite intense lobbying by hardliners (Ollus, 2015). When tensions in Tripoli and Benghazi escalated into civil war in mid-2014, Bani Walid was too divided to take a position. Unlike many of the tribal constituencies with which it had previously sought to create a counter-revolutionary alliance, Bani Walid had not formed combat units and made no significant contributions to the "Army of Tribes" fighting with Zintanis against Libya Dawn. The Social Council has also been unable to use its ostensibly neutral position in the conflict to mediate between the warring parties and regain political influence. Hardliners on the council and in exile have blocked any rapprochement with Misrata, which is indispensable to any mediating role. Given by internal divisions, Bani Walid has failed to influence Libya's ongoing power struggle (Donnelly, 2007). In both cities, local elites adopted confrontational strategies in national politics to cement their own local position, invoking the need for local unity. That approach backfired, because it wrought havoc on their own communities for political ends that were increasingly less clear. Widening local rifts were the consequence, with hardliners torpedoing attempts at conflict resolution. Variations of this pattern have played out across Libya. Gone are the clear-cut divisions of 2011, which required communities to take sides unequivocally. Since then, the options open to rival local actors have multiplied, while the conditions for consolidating leadership at the local level remain elusive (Ollus, 2015). The analysis above supports the hypothesis that the emergence of factional government in Libya hinders UN.GIFT in its fight against human trafficking.

1.1 Statement of Problem

The ineffectiveness in the combat of human trafficking in Libya is a result of many challenges ranging from porous borders, inadequate personnel, social and economic, amongst others. Discussing some of these challenges is essential to our understanding of the ongoing combat against the menace. Due to the complex nature of the crime, traffickers often operate under the radar, and those trafficked are not likely to identify as victims, often blaming themselves for their situation. This makes it more difficult to identify the crime because victims rarely report their situation. Lack of institutional capacity, as well as lack of Libyan law enforcement, customs, and military personnel, especially along its borders incapacitated UN.GIFT in its fight against human trafficking. Libyan law criminalized some forms of sex trafficking, but did not criminalize labor trafficking (Gallagher, 2009). Articles 418, 419, and 420 of the penal code criminalized some forms of sex trafficking involving women, and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment and a fine between 100 and 500 Libyan dinars (\$72-\$361), which were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes such as rape (Pourmokhtari, 2015). However, inconsistent with international law, the definition of trafficking within these provisions required transnational movement of the victim and did not criminalize sex trafficking acts that were induced through fraudulent or coercive means. The law did not criminalize sex trafficking involving adult male victims (Kempadoo, 2012). International observers reported rampant complicity of government officials involved in human trafficking and migrant smuggling operations, including Libyan Coast Guard officials, immigration officers, security officials, Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials, members of armed groups formally integrated into state institutions, as well as officials from the MOI and MOI's Department to Combat Irregular Migration (DCIM) (Breznau, 2016). Several credible sources continued to report that DCIM prison officials and detention camp guards forced detained migrants and refugees to work in DCIM-run detention centers and on farms and construction sites. According to an international organization, the Special Deterrence Force, which nominally operated under the MOI, was involved in the trafficking of detained migrants and benefited from extortion payments sent by the migrants' family members for the migrants' release (Regoezi, 2008). Additionally, during the reporting period, the MOD continued to operate an anti-illegal migration unit with strong affiliation to one of the two armed groups involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking in northwestern Libya; this allegiance allowed the armed group to continually shift its activities from committing smuggling and trafficking crimes, to policing migrants for the government. In June 2018, the UN and the United States sanctioned a top regional leader of the Libyan Coast Guard's Unit in the city of Zawiya and the leader of the Shuhada al-Wadi militia, who ran the GNA-controlled Nasr migrant detention center, for alleged involvement in human trafficking and migrant smuggling (Barner,

2014). The GNA removed the Coast Guard official from his position, but it did not initiate further investigation or prosecute either official for these allegations. The GNA was supportive of these sanctions and issued public statements of condemnation against the trafficking and smuggling of migrants (Ezeilo, 2015).

1.2 Research Questions

1. What is the rationale behind human trafficking in Libya?
2. What is the United Nations opinion about trafficking?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to examine how factional government hindered UNGIFT'S fight against human trafficking in Libya.

The specific objectives are as follows:

1. To know the rationale behind human trafficking in Libya.
2. To find out the opinion of United Nations about trafficking

1.4 Hypotheses

1. There are reasons for human trafficking in Libya.
2. United Nations has its opinion about trafficking

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 United Nations Global Initiative

The United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT) is a multi-stakeholder initiative providing global access to expertise, knowledge and innovative partnerships to combat human trafficking. UN.GIFT was launched in March 2007 by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with a grant made on behalf of the United Arab Emirates. It is managed in cooperation with the International Labour Organization (ILO); the International Organization for Migration (IOM); the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF); the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). (ILO, 2012). UN.GIFT works with all stakeholders - governments, business, academia, civil society and the media - to support each other's work, create new partnerships and develop effective tools to fight human trafficking. The Global Initiative is based on a simple principle: human trafficking is a crime of such magnitude and atrocity that it cannot be dealt with successfully by any government alone. This global problem requires a global, multi-stakeholder strategy that builds on national efforts throughout the world. To pave the way for this strategy, stakeholders must coordinate efforts already underway, increase knowledge and awareness, provide technical assistance; promote effective rights-based responses; build capacity of state and non-state stakeholders; foster partnerships for joint action; and above all, ensure that everybody takes responsibility for this fight. By encouraging and facilitating cooperation and coordination, UN.GIFT aims to create synergies among the anti-trafficking activities of UN agencies, international organizations and other stakeholders to develop the most efficient and cost-effective approach to fight human trafficking. (ILO, 2008). UN.GIFT mobilizes State and non-State actors to eradicate human trafficking. In carrying out its mission, UN.GIFT will increase knowledge and awareness on human trafficking; promote effective rights-based responses; build capacity of State and non-State actors; and foster partnerships for joint action against human trafficking. The goals of UN.GIFT are:

1. To foster awareness, global commitment and action to counter human trafficking in partnership with different stakeholders including governments, the international community, non-governmental organizations and other elements of civil society and the media; and
2. To assist countries in creating and strengthening support structures for victims of trafficking.

The core areas of UN.GIFT's work are: 1. Global and collective advocacy efforts to help raise awareness of human trafficking; 2. Evidence-based knowledge on human trafficking to feed into national, regional and global policy-making; 3. Greater coordination and cooperation among international organizations and innovative public-private partnerships; 4. System-wide, institutional and individual capacity development of stakeholders through the delivery of technical assistance. (ILO, 2012).

2.2 Human Trafficking

Human trafficking is the trade of humans for the purpose of forced labour, sexual slavery, or commercial sexual exploitation for the trafficker or others. This may encompass providing a spouse in the context of forced marriage, or the extraction of organs or tissues, including for surrogacy and ova removal. Human trafficking can occur within a country or transnationally. Human trafficking is a crime against the person because of the

violation of the victim's rights of movement through coercion and because of their commercial exploitation. Human trafficking is the trade in people, especially women and children, and does not necessarily involve the movement of the person from one place to another (Fredette, 2009). Trafficking in persons is a serious crime and a grave violation of human rights. Every year, thousands of men, women and children fall into the hands of traffickers, in their own countries and abroad. Trafficking for organ removal was a complex issue that included controversial technical, ethical, legal and medical considerations. Such trafficking also involved a unique range of actors, including surgeons and hospital staff, who collaborated with criminal networks, brokers and middlemen who recruited donors from among the most vulnerable groups of society. Almost every country in the world is affected by trafficking, whether as a country of origin, transit or destination for victims. UNODC, as guardian of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the Protocols thereto, assists States in their efforts to implement the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (Fredette, 2009). UNODC offers practical help to States, not only helping to draft laws and create comprehensive national anti-trafficking strategies but also assisting with resources to implement them. States receive specialized assistance including the development of local capacity and expertise, as well as practical tools to encourage cross-border cooperation in investigations and prosecutions.

The adoption in 2000 by the United Nations General Assembly of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children marked a significant milestone in international efforts to stop the trade in people. As the guardian of the Protocol, UNODC addresses human trafficking issues through its Global Programme against Trafficking in Persons. A vast majority of States have now signed and ratified the Protocol. But translating it into reality remains problematic. Very few criminals are convicted and most victims are probably never identified or assisted (Obakata, 2006). Trafficking in Persons is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

3. DISCUSSION

There are reasons for human trafficking in Libya

Libya is a transit and destination country for men and women from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation. While most foreigners in Libya are economic migrants, in some cases large smuggling debts of \$500–\$2,000 and illegal status leave them vulnerable to various forms of coercion, resulting in cases of forced prostitution and forced labor. As of 2018 more governments as well as the UN began acknowledging the continuous violations of human rights as well as the chronic failures by the Libyan authorities to address the issue. As of June 2008 and as in previous years, there had been isolated reports that women from sub-Saharan Africa were trafficked to Libya for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation. Although precise figures were unavailable, foreign observers estimated in 2008 that about one to two percent of Libya's 1.5 to 2 million foreigners may be victims of trafficking. As of June 2008, the Government of Libya did not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but was making significant efforts to do so. The U.S. Department of State placed Libya on Tier 2 Watch List for its failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to address trafficking in persons, particularly in the area of investigating and prosecuting human trafficking offenses. During 2007, Libya provided in-kind assistance to training programs designed to educate law enforcement and civil society groups about trafficking. The government appointed a national anti-trafficking coordinator responsible for protecting trafficking victims and punishing trafficking offenders. As in previous years, however, Libya did not publicly release any data on investigations or punishment of any trafficking offenses. The above assertions support our first hypothesis that there are reasons for human trafficking in Libya.

United Nations has its opinion about trafficking

Target 8.7 of the UN 2030 Agenda calls for us to "take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and

human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all ...The United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT) was conceived to promote the global fight on human trafficking, on the basis of international agreements reached at the UN. UN.GIFT was launched in March 26, 2007 by UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) UNODC with a grant made on behalf of the United Arab Emirates (Breznau, 2016). On 31 December 2014, the United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT), an alliance of six organizations committed to combating human trafficking, concluded its long-standing work towards curbing one of the most heinous crimes and human rights violations of our time (Obataka, 2006). Members of UN.GIFT are: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), International Labour Organization (ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Aas, 2007). The objectives of UN.GIFT is to promote initiatives aimed at grasping the government, civil society and companies so as to attempt an adequate address of human trafficking issues, which also involves recruiting and transportation for sexual exploitation or slavery (Musto, 2009). UN.GIFT also aims at mobilizing state and non-state players to eradicate human trafficking by reducing both the vulnerability of potential victims and the demand for exploitation in all its forms; ensuring adequate protection and support to those who do fall victim, as well as efficient prosecution of the criminals involved (ILO, 2008).

March 26, 2007 marked 200 years since the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. (Breznau, 2016). Within UN.GIFT, UNODC launched a research exercise to gather primary data on national responses to trafficking in persons worldwide (Ollus, 2015). This exercise resulted in the publication of the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons in February 2009. The report gathers official information for 155 countries and territories in the areas of legal and institutional framework, criminal justice response and victim assistance services. UN.GIFT works with all stakeholders - governments, business, academia, civil society and the media to support each other's work, create new partnerships, and develop effective tools to fight human trafficking (Haynes, 2009). The extent of violence against victims of trafficking in Libya is severe, the government's position about human trafficking continues to be one of confusion, leaving victims unprotected and without remedies (Chacon, 2006.) There is poor implementation of domestic violence law in Libya, and laws punishing sexual violence are inadequate. The government prosecutes only the most violent rape cases, and judges have the authority to propose marriage between the rapist and the victim as a "social remedy" to the crime. Rape victims themselves risk prosecution for adultery or fornication if they attempt to press charges. Many victims' families coerce them into marriage in order to avoid public scandal (Gallagher, 2009) The Global Initiative is focused in combating human trafficking seen to be a crime of such magnitude and atrocity that cannot be successfully dealt with by any government alone. This global problem requires global, multi-stakeholder strategy that builds on national efforts throughout the world. (Haynes, 2009). It is on this note that the researcher is examining UN.GIFT and human trafficking in Libya. This analysis is in support of our second hypothesis that United Nations has its opinion about human trafficking

4. FINDINGS

1. Factional government in Libya's created a fragmented political scene that posed persistent obstacles to UN.GIFT due to the ongoing conflict between rival groups with its own parliament and government seeking control of the territory of Libya.
2. Many years of struggles over national power between the factional governments claiming to represent their territories have eroded local cohesion and harmony.
3. Libya's factional government resulted to deeper fragmentation and higher obstacles to conflict management and resolution.
4. If the state implements anti-trafficking laws, there will be insignificant result since the border patrol officers, federal agents and local police officers are not well-versed in international or domestic laws in regards to human trafficking.
5. Nine years after the fall of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya continues to struggle to end its violent conflict and build state institutions. External actors have exacerbated Libya's problems by funneling money and weapons to proxies that have put personal interests above those of the Libyan people

5. RECOMMENDATION

1. U.N. should broker a lasting peace which ought to overshadow competing peace conferences sponsored by various foreign governments. Meanwhile, The porosity of Libya's borders should be controlled particularly in the southern Fezzan in order to reduce trafficking and smuggling of illicit materials, including weapons.
2. Factional governments in Libya that created a fragmented political scene should have formed a coalition government in order to help boost the activities of UN.GIFT in its fight against trafficking..
3. The resources spent in many years of struggles over national power between the factional governments should have been used to combat human trafficking.
4. Libya's factional government should have formed a unity government that would facilitate peaceful coexistence and conflict resolution.
5. Training of law enforcement agents, migration and judicial officials should be given uppermost priority for easy identification of trafficking victims among vulnerable populations particularly among females involved in prostitution, etc.,

6. CONCLUSION

The emergence of UN.GIFT has accelerated global awareness about human trafficking. UN.GIFT is ensuring that anti-trafficking strategies are embedded in every policy area, from improving female education in source countries so that girls are less vulnerable to trafficking, to increasing police pay in destination countries so that officers are less susceptible to bribery. Corruption is a root cause and a facilitating tool in carrying out and sustaining human trafficking in persons and it needs to be taken into account when dealing with that illicit trade. Most human trafficking would have little chance of success if it were not for the complicity of public- and sometimes private-sector officials. Corruption ranges from active involvement to passive negligence, and it is often the lubricant that allows victims to be selected, transported and held against their will. One of the biggest impediments to reducing the vulnerability of potential victims of human trafficking efforts is a lack of understanding of the issue.

REFERENCES

- Aas, K.F. (2007). *Globalization and crime*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Bales, K. (2012). *Disposable people: New slavery in the global economy*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Barner, J.R., Okech, D., and Camp, M.A. (2014). Socio-economic inequality, human trafficking, and the global slave trade. *Societies*, 4(2), 148-160.
- Chacón, J. M. (2006). Misery and myopia: Understanding the failures of US efforts to stop human trafficking. *Immigr. & Nat'lity L. Rev.*, 27, 331-394.
- Dahrendorf, R. (1958). Out of utopia: Toward a restructuring of sociological analysis. *American Journal of Sociology*, 64(2), 115-127.
- Donnelly, J. (2007). The relative universality of human rights. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 29(2), 281-306.
- Ebo, E.C (1998). *Social and economic research: principles and methods*. Lagos: Academic Publications and Department Resources Limited, Bereslon
- Edwin, I.E. (2022). United nations global initiative and human trafficking in Libya (2007 2020). *International journal of social sciences and management review*. Volume: 05, Issue: 01 January - February 2022
- Fredette (2009). Revisiting the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking: Striking balances for more effective legislation. *Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 17, 101-134.
- Gallagher, A.T. (2001). Human rights and the new UN Protocols on trafficking and migrant smuggling: A preliminary analysis. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 23(4), 975- 1004.
- Global index of trafficking in person (2011) Human trafficking in Sub Sahara Africa. Retrieved from [https://accounts/1000/shared/books/trafficking in persons flow in Global trafficking index \(2016\). Regional Analysis: Sub Sahara Africa](https://accounts/1000/shared/books/trafficking%20in%20persons%20flow%20in%20global%20trafficking%20index%20(2016).%20Regional%20Analysis%20Sub%20Sahara%20Africa). Retrieved from <http://www.globaltraffickingindex.org/region/sub-sahara-africa>.
- Goodey, J. (2008). Human trafficking: Sketchy data and policy responses. *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, 8(4), 421-442.

- Haynes, D.F. (2009). Exploitation nation: The thin and grey legal lines between trafficked persons and abused migrant laborers. *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy*, 23(1), 1-72.
- Hegel, G.W.F. (1977). *Phenomenology of spirit*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kangaspunta, K. (2007). Collecting data on human trafficking: Availability, reliability and comparability of trafficking data. In E. U. Savona & S. Stefanizzi (Eds.), *Measuring Human Trafficking* (pp. 27-36). New York: Springer.
- Kempadoo, K., Sanghera, J., & Pattanaik, B. (2012). *Trafficking and prostitution reconsidered: New perspectives on migration, sex work, and human rights*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Laczko, F., & Gramegna, M. A. (2003). Developing better indicators of human trafficking. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 10(1), 179-194.
- Miethe, T.D., Hart, T.C., & Regoeczi, W.C. (2008). The conjunctive analysis of case configurations: An exploratory method for discrete multivariate analyses of crime
- Musto, J.L. (2009). What's in a name? Conflations and contradictions in contemporary U.S. discourses of human trafficking. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 32(4), 281-287.
- Neumann, I.B. (1996). Self and other in international relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 2(2), 139-174.
- Obokata, T. (2006). *Trafficking of human beings from a human rights perspective*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Ollus, N. (2015). Regulating forced labour and combating human trafficking: The relevance of historical definitions in a contemporary perspective. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 63(5), 221-246.
- Pourmokhtari, N. (2015). Global human trafficking unmasked: A feminist rights-based approach. *Journal of Human Trafficking*, 1(2), 156-166. sub sahara Africa- Google Search.